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Between Code and Treatise:  The Hard Challenge of the 
Restatement of Copyright 
Joseph P. Liu* 
The proposed Restatement of Copyright raises a question that has been obvious 
to everyone from the very start of the project:  How do you restate an area of the law 
governed by a comprehensive federal statute?  Restatements have, to date, focused 
near-exclusively on common law subjects.  The Reporters of other Restatements thus 
did not operate in the shadow of an authoritative uniform federal statute.  Instead, 
they faced an unruly and “ever-growing mass of decisions in the many different 
jurisdictions, state and federal, within the United States.”1  From this mass of 
decisions, the Reporters derived the “black-letter law” and “restated” the law in a 
form resembling a code.2  In doing so, reporters sought to bring order, clarity, and 
coherence to a body of law that lacked any other means of doing so.  But if this act 
of restating the law in the form of a code is a central feature of a Restatement, then 
how do you restate an area of law that already has a comprehensive code?  What is 
to be gained by essentially re-codifying the law? 
Two Articles in this Special Issue provide two different answers to this question.  
Professors Jeanne Fromer and Jessica Silbey argue that a Restatement of Copyright 
can still be valuable because, although there exists a comprehensive copyright 
statute, much of copyright law is still judge-made.3  In some cases, this is because 
the statutory language is open-ended, and the many federal courts have interpreted 
statutory terms in varying ways in the forty-plus years since the current Copyright 
Act was passed.  In other cases, this is because the statute expressly delegates to the 
 
 * Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  Thanks to Jane Ginsburg and Alfred Yen for 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT, at xi (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 8, 
2020) [hereinafter Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020)] (quoting AM. L. INST., CAPTURING THE 
VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE:  A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW 
THEIR WORK 4 (rev. ed. 2015) [hereinafter ALI, CAPTURING THE VOICE]). 
 2. Id. (“Restatements—‘analytical, critical and constructive’—accordingly resemble codifications 
more than mere compilations of the pronouncements of judges.  The Institute’s founders envisioned a 
Restatement’s black letter statement of legal rules as being ‘made with the care and precision of a well-
drawn statute.’” (quoting ALI, CAPTURING THE VOICE, supra note 1, at 5)). 
 3. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Jessica Silbey, Retelling Copyright:  The Contributions of the 
Restatement of Copyright Law, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 341 (2021). 
 
© 2021 Liu.  This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative 
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federal courts the task of implementing and articulating broad standards.4  In still 
other cases, this is because the statute is built upon a foundation of pre-existing 
common law concepts.5  In any case, a codification of these open areas of law can 
play a valuable and legitimate role by stating the black letter law and bringing order 
and coherence to a body of judge-made law. 
Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Peter Menell see a more fundamental 
problem with the Restatement project, as currently structured.6  Judges writing 
copyright opinions are not acting as common law judges, free to adapt and change 
the law in response to broad principles.  Instead, they are interpreting a statute, and 
thus are bound by the text and the interpretive methods (often contested) used to 
make sense of that text.  Any attempt to “restate” the law is problematic because it 
displaces the primacy of the statutory text.  The conventional approach taken by 
common law Restatements is thus ill-suited to a statutory area of law.  Nevertheless, 
Balganesh and Menell believe that the Restatement project can be saved.  Instead of 
attempting to restate the law, the Restatement should simply quote the relevant 
portion of the text of the statute.  It should then follow this with a new section 
incorporating the relevant legislative history and other interpretive materials, before 
moving to the usual Comments and Reporters’ Notes.  Thus properly reconfigured, 
the Restatement can still serve as a useful resource for federal judges dealing with 
open areas of copyright law.7 
Although both Articles adopt very different attitudes towards the Restatement 
project, they share the view that the Restatement, whether in its current or a modified 
form, is a legitimate exercise and can serve a valuable role in bringing clarity to open 
areas of copyright law.  From the start, the Restatement of Copyright has faced strong 
objections due to the statutory nature of the subject.  Industry participants, agency 
officials, and even legislators have expressed concerns that the Restatement is an 
attempt to sideline the statutory text, to replace the positive law of copyright with a 
parallel code reflecting the policy preferences of a group of academics.8  To address 
these concerns, Fromer and Silbey emphasize the conventional nature of the 
Restatement project.  The Restatement falls within a long tradition of “re-telling” the 
law,9 and the resulting provisions are “routine and straightforward.  They will 
surprise no one and are almost boring in their adherence to and synthesis of the 
 
 4. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 5. For example:  originality, initial ownership, and infringement. 
 6. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, Restatements of Statutory Law:  The Curious 
Case of the Restatement of Copyright, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 285 (2021). 
 7. Note that as a latecomer to the Restatement debate, I do not have a stake in the controversies 
that led to the decision to proceed with the Restatement of Copyright.  Thus, in this Response, I do not 
engage with the parts of both Articles that recount those controversies.  Instead, my focus is on the current 
results of the Restatement process. 
 8.  See Justin Hughes, Restating Copyright Law’s Originality Requirement, 44 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 383, 386–87 (2021). 
 9. “Stating the law, saying what it means, and then applying it in a particular context are what 
lawyers and judges do all the time.  In this way, restating—or ‘retelling’—the law is both normal and 
inevitable.  A restatement of law is another way of saying what the law is.”  Fromer & Silbey, supra note 
3, at 343. 
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copyright statute and judicial interpretations of it.”10  Balganesh and Menell, by 
contrast, address concerns about legitimacy by essentially abandoning the task of 
restating the law and substituting the text of the statute itself.  In this way, the 
Restatement does not seek to usurp the statutory text, but is instead a helpful 
supplement.  
Yet in bolstering the legitimacy of the Restatement in these ways, the two Articles 
reveal another problem:  a mismatch between what the Restatement of Copyright is 
and what it is perceived to be.  The Restatement of Copyright, as envisioned by both 
Articles, resembles less a “codification” or a “well-drawn statute”—less a 
Restatement—and more a treatise or an annotated code.  As Fromer and Silbey 
indicate, many of the provisions of the draft Restatement are indeed “routine and 
straightforward,” largely because they repeat what can be found in a copyright 
treatise or casebook.11  And a Restatement configured along the lines Balganesh and 
Menell suggest resembles a sophisticated annotated code, starting with the statutory 
text and then providing supporting interpretive materials and commentary.  This is 
not to understate the value of such an undertaking.  In both cases, the resulting work 
can be valuable.  Yet the result falls short of what many expect a Restatement to be.   
This is because a restatement of a common law subject is different, not only 
because the subject lacks a comprehensive statute, but because of a fundamental 
difference in institutional structure giving rise to the law.  For a common law subject, 
there is no higher authority.  The common law is found in decisions scattered across 
fifty-plus jurisdictions, and there is no institutional body charged with unifying or 
making sense of this mass of decisions.  A common law Restatement thus stands 
alone, free to restate the law in the form of a code, to create a new centralizing and 
generative text, without concerns about repeating another code, and without the need 
to make its pronouncements consistent with those of any other institutional body.  It 
is free to redefine terms, articulate broad principles, and restructure and organize the 
law.  And although treatises for such common law subjects exist, they generally do 
not attempt to restate the law in the form of a code.  A common law Restatement sits 
comfortably between the unruly body of common law and already-existing treatises. 
The Restatement of Copyright enjoys no such freedom.  Not only is it hampered 
by the awkward fact of an already-existing codification of the law.  It is also not free 
to fully restate the law according to its own conception of what the law is or should 
be.  Instead, it is bound by the authority, text, structure, and policies of the statute.  
And worse, not just by the statute, but by the authoritative decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court interpreting that statute.  Thus, unlike a common law field, copyright 
already has a surfeit of authoritative centralizing institutions, expressly charged with 
resolving conflicts among courts and bringing order and consistency to the doctrine.  
The Restatement of Copyright must thus limit itself to the more modest task of 
 
 10. Id. at 344. 
 11. This is not to say that none of the Restatement provisions is controversial.  Indeed, some of the 
proposed provisions have generated a good degree of criticism and opposition.  See, e.g., Eric J. Schwartz, 
Restatement of the Law, Copyright:  A Useful Resource for Practitioners and the Courts or a Rashomon 
Exercise?, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 425, 426–31 (2021).  However, other provisions have not proven 
controversial. 
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working in the interstices, restating the parts of copyright law that have not yet been 
settled by Congress or by the Supreme Court. 
The Reporters of the Restatement of Copyright thus face the unenviable task of 
steering a narrow course between the authoritative code, as interpreted by an 
authoritative court, on one hand and the many, already-existing copyright treatises 
on the other.  And in doing so, the Reporters risk creating a gap between what the 
Restatement is and what many perceive it to be.  A more constrained Restatement, 
as described above, sits in some tension with common understandings of what a 
Restatement is.  This may explain why the project has been so controversial from the 
start.  Why, in the end, is a Restatement necessary if we already have a code on the 
one hand and a number of treatises on the other?  What distinct value does the 
Restatement add, if it cannot uniquely play the centralizing, codifying, and 
rationalizing role that other common law Restatements play? 
In this Response, I will try to develop these arguments in more detail while 
commenting on the two articles described above.  I start by focusing first on the way 
the two articles differ in their attitude towards the Restatement’s central task of 
restating or recodifying copyright law.  I then turn to the ways the two articles find 
common ground in their belief that a Restatement, in either its current or modified 
form, can play a legitimate and useful role in helping to clarify the open-ended areas 
of copyright law.  I conclude by offering a number of thoughts and suggestions.  
I.  
The two Articles described above differ significantly, and in interesting ways, in 
how they view judicial development of copyright law, and this directly affects their 
attitudes towards the Restatement of Copyright’s central task:  restating or codifying 
copyright law.  Fromer and Silbey see little difference between restating traditional 
common law subjects and restating the portions of the Copyright Act that require the 
federal courts to interpret broad statutory terms or develop the law in a common law 
fashion.  In both cases, the courts are given discretion to develop the law as they see 
fit, in accordance with broader principles and policies.  In these areas, a Restatement 
can helpfully organize the body of potentially conflicting case law.  Fromer and 
Silbey acknowledge that there are other parts of copyright law where Congress has 
legislated in exacting detail, and where courts do not have much discretion.  In these 
areas, a Restatement approach may not fit, but in their view, these areas are peripheral 
to the larger body of judge-made law, the exception and not the rule.12  
Balganesh and Menell, by contrast, see a more fundamental difference.  Even in 
areas of copyright law where the law is unclear and judges have some discretion, that 
discretion is bounded by the methods and practices of statutory interpretation.  Courts 
must look to the text, the legislative history, and/or the context in order to find the 
 
 12. Fromer & Silbey, supra note 3, at 363.  Note that it is not entirely clear from the Article 
precisely what Fromer and Silbey would do with these detailed provisions of the code, i.e., try to restate 
them despite the ill fit or exclude them from the Restatement entirely.  Although they do not explicitly lay 
this out, I believe that their argument best suits the latter approach, although I want to make clear that this 
is my view, not necessarily theirs. 
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right answer.  In their Article, Balganesh and Menell explore the early hostility the 
ALI’s Restatement project evinced towards statutory subjects and argue that many 
of the reasons for that hostility continue to apply today.  Balganesh and Menell 
unearth a historical precedent, the ALI’s abandoned attempt to restate the law of 
business associations, which illustrates a “deep mismatch” between the Restatement 
methodology and a statutory subject.13  Balganesh and Menell then use the debate 
over the proper scope of the public distribution right to highlight the way judges 
engage with legislative materials in a way fundamentally different from that of 
common law judges.  This fundamental difference requires changes in the typical 
methodology employed by the Restatements.  Balganesh and Menell are thus far 
more skeptical of the current approach. 
I confess that my own sympathies lie with Balganesh and Menell on this score.  
To some extent, one’s view about the propriety of restating copyright law may 
depend on how one sees the Copyright Act as a whole, and the balance between the 
provisions that are open-ended and the provisions that are specific and detailed.  The 
Copyright Act of 1976 is, in many ways, a hybrid act.14  Parts of the Act do delegate 
a tremendous amount of discretion to the federal courts to develop the law in a 
common law-like fashion.15  At the same time, other parts of the Copyright Act are 
exquisitely and sometimes painfully detailed.16  Fromer and Silbey view the latter 
portions of the Copyright Act as “peripheral.”  I am not so sure, and this may affect 
my perspective on the wisdom of restating a statutory subject.17 
More fundamentally, even in areas where the law is uncertain or open-ended, 
restating a statutory subject raises questions, not just about legitimacy (which seems 
to be the main concern of Fromer and Silbey), but of practical value and effect.  A 
Restatement is more than just a useful reference work, or in Fromer and Silbey’s 
terms, a “re-telling” of the law.  Rather, it is, or aspires to be, a codification of the 
law:  “Restatements—‘analytical, critical and constructive’—accordingly resemble 
codifications more than mere compilations of the pronouncements of judges.  The 
Institute’s founders envisioned a Restatement’s black-letter statement of legal rules 
as being ‘made with the care and precision of a well-drawn statute.’”18  This is 
reflected in the way the Restatement’s sections are drafted, appearing for all intents 
and purposes like a statute.  It is also reflected in how courts typically cite 
Restatement provisions, as persuasive statements of the law, rather than looser 
summaries; as another authority, rather than just the view of another treatise.19 
 
 13. Balganesh & Menell, supra note 6, at 301–05.   
 14. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004); see also Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Copyright as Legal Process:  The Transformation of American Copyright Law, 168 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1101 (2020). 
 15. For example:  originality, initial ownership, infringement, third-party liability, and fair use. 
 16. For example:  termination of transfers, limitations on public performance rights, statutory 
licenses for musical works, sound recordings, and cable and satellite television broadcasts. 
 17. It is hard to imagine how the Restatement will “restate” a provision like § 115, which is the 
result of intense interest group bargaining. 
 18. ALI, CAPTURING THE VOICE, supra note 1, at 5. 
 19. The Restatement is careful to note that it does not aspire to the authority of an actual statute:  
“Although Restatements are expected to aspire toward the precision of statutory language, they are also 
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Yet if a Restatement is a codification of the law, then a Restatement of copyright 
law is a re-codification of the law, since a code already exists.  In restating a common 
law subject, the value of codification is clear, as there exists no similar authoritative 
code.  But when there already exists a code, this raises the inevitable question:  What 
is the value of restating the code?  What is the value of constructing, in effect, a 
parallel code?  And could the construction of such a parallel code do more harm than 
good?  This is not a question that common law Restatements face since they do not 
have to compete with or operate in the shadow of a comprehensive code.20 
One possibility is that, in some areas, recodification adds no value at all, and 
indeed the draft Restatement of Copyright seems to acknowledge this at points.  For 
example, § 2 of the draft Restatement repeats nearly-verbatim portions of the text of 
§ 102(a) of the Copyright Act, listing the “works of authorship” protected by 
copyright law.21  Similarly, in §§ 3 and 4, the draft Restatement quotes verbatim from 
the statute’s definitions of “derivative work,” “compilation,” and “collective 
work.”22  Section 8’s treatment of “fixation” also largely quotes the relevant statutory 
language.23  In these places, the draft Restatement seems to recognize that nothing 
would be gained by rewriting the statutory provision in its own words.24  
Another possibility is that recodification allows for a reorganization of statutory 
provisions that makes the new codification more useful to judges and practitioners 
by collecting a number of related doctrinal issues or providing a conceptual 
framework for understanding scattered and disparate provisions.  Thus, § 1 of the 
draft Restatement collects in one place many of the requirements for copyrightability 
that are found in different sections of the Copyright Act.25  The idea appears to be to 
collect in one place all, or at least many, of these requirements to make it easier for 
judges or practitioners to determine when a work is protected.  This also allows the 
draft Restatement to bundle these issues conceptually and comment upon them as a 
whole.  
A third possibility is that, in the areas of copyright law that are more expressly 
common law in nature, the Restatement will act as a true initial codification, insofar 
as the statutory text runs out.  In these areas, the body of judge-made law truly 
resembles that of other common law Restatement subjects.  Thus, in the areas of 
infringement, fair use, and others, the Restatement may in fact provide the kind of 
initial codification that has thus far been missing, a new text where none existed 
 
intended to reflect the flexibility and capacity for development and growth of the common law.  They are 
therefore phrased not in the mandatory terms of a statute but in the descriptive terms of a judge announcing 
the law to be applied in a given case.”  Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020), at xi (quoting ALI, 
CAPTURING THE VOICE, supra note 1, at 5). 
 20. Note that model codes also do not typically face this problem since, although there may be 
many codes in many jurisdictions, there is usually no single authoritative code that the model code must 
compete with. 
 21. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2(a), at 9 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). 
 22. Id. §§ 3(a), 4(a), 4(b), at 26, 44 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 23. Id. § 8, at 74 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 24.   In some instances, this recognition came in response to objections to initial efforts to restate 
some of these provisions.  See, e.g., id. (fixation). 
 25. Id. § 1, at 1. 
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before.  Fromer and Silbey argue that the value of the Restatement lies primarily in 
these areas of copyright law, and acknowledge that it may be of less value in the 
more detailed areas of the Copyright Act.26 
Although there may well be value in such a recodification, there are risks as well.  
Just as the creation of a parallel code may clarify parts of the Copyright Act, it may 
also create more complexity and confusion.  Courts and practitioners, in using the 
Restatement, will need to map its provisions to the relevant sections of the Copyright 
Act, since, as Balganesh and Menell argue, the actual text of the Copyright Act 
controls.  Thus, there is a practical limit on the ability of the Restatement to 
comprehensively reorganize the field, as it must track in some way the governing 
statute.  Moreover, it could be argued that the structure and framework of the 
Copyright Act itself is most important for judges and practitioners to understand, and 
thus any re-organization of the doctrines may not only be unhelpful but stand in the 
way of such an understanding.  Indeed, as Balganesh and Menell argue, it may have 
the effect of obscuring the statutory origins of some doctrines and the need to consult 
materials relevant to statutory interpretation. 
Finally, there is the risk that, in restating certain provisions or doctrines, the 
Restatement may introduce new terminology and ambiguities.  One of the benefits 
of a common law restatement is the use of consistent and precise terminology in the 
face of many inconsistent or loose terms used in many jurisdictions.  This kind of 
precision is helpful in bringing conceptual clarity and consistency to doctrines across 
jurisdictions.  Any divergence between the terms used in particular jurisdictions and 
those used by the Restatement can be justified by the desire to bring uniformity and 
conceptual clarity to a common law field.  Where there exists an authoritative 
statutory text, however, introducing new terms or formulations risks creating new 
uncertainties.  
Professor Justin Hughes’s contribution to the Special Issue provides a nice 
example of the risks posed by restating doctrinal or statutory terms.27  Sections 5, 6, 
and 7 of the draft restate copyright law’s “originality” requirement.  Section 5 sets 
forth the black letter understanding of the statutory term “original,” as consisting of 
two elements:  (1) independent creation; and (2) minimal creativity.28  Hughes notes 
in passing the draft’s choice of “minimal” creativity, rather than a “modicum” of 
creativity, a formulation that appears more commonly in the case law, and wonders 
why the Reporters for the Restatement made this choice, as there is no explanation 
in the text.29  Although it may be safe to assume that the two are one and the same, 
this formulation introduces a new term and the potential for uncertainty. 
Hughes then takes a careful look at the precise language the draft provisions use 
to define both elements.  He highlights ways in which the particular formulation of 
these requirements in the Restatement may not accurately reflect the underlying case 
law and could be drafted with more clarity.30  Hughes’s careful analysis of the precise 
 
 26. See Fromer & Silbey, supra note 3, at 362–64. 
 27. See generally Hughes, supra note 8. 
 28. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 5, at 55. 
 29. Hughes, supra note 8, at 389. 
 30. Id. at 390–94, 403–09. 
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words used in the Restatement reflects the perspective of one experienced with 
legislative drafting and highlights the fact that, once again, a Restatement is not 
simply a treatise, which can describe an area of law in a looser fashion, with later 
clarification and development.  Rather, it is a codification of an area of law, and the 
precise terms therefore matter.  The act of restating the law thus brings with it the 
risk that new ambiguities or uncertainties may be introduced.  In a common law field, 
the risk is outweighed by the benefit of codifying the law in the first instance.  But 
in a statutory field, the question is whether these risks are worth running, whether the 
benefit of another codification is worth it when one already exists, even if 
imperfect.31 
II. 
Despite the differences noted above regarding the wisdom and value of restating 
copyright law, both Fromer and Silbey, and Balganesh and Menell agree that the 
Restatement project, whether in its current form or properly modified, can play a 
legitimate and useful role in helping to rationalize the open areas of copyright law.  
As noted above, Fromer and Silbey bolster the legitimacy of the Restatement project 
by focusing on its role in clarifying the open areas of copyright law.  Even though 
copyright is governed by a comprehensive federal statute, there are many areas where 
the federal courts have had to develop the case law, whether to interpret ambiguous 
terms, or to fulfill a legislative delegation of authority to develop the law, or to 
continue to interpret broad terms incorporated into the statute.  Fromer and Silbey 
also emphasize that more than forty years have passed since the enactment of the 
statute, years characterized by dramatic changes in technology.  The statute was 
meant to be a “copyright statute for the ages.”  As a result, an extensive body of case 
law has been developed by the federal courts, and a Restatement can play an 
important role in bringing order and coherence to this body of law.32 
In supporting the Restatement and countering arguments that the Restatement is 
attempting to supplant the statute, Fromer and Silbey repeatedly emphasize the 
unexceptional nature of the Restatement’s task: 
The provisions at issue in the draft Restatement of Copyright Law on which ALI 
membership will vote at ALI’s upcoming annual meeting are central to copyright 
doctrine and have been the subject of numerous court decisions over the past several 
decades of technological and industry change:  originality, fixation, categories of 
copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, and authorship and 
ownership.  This abundance of legal activity on copyright law demonstrates the value 
to the profession of this project retelling copyright.  In contrast to the dramatic criticism 
of this Restatement project alleging political capture or illegitimate law reform, the 
draft’s provisions are routine and straightforward.  They will surprise no one and are 
almost boring in their adherence to and synthesis of the copyright statute and judicial 
 
 31. Note that both Hughes’s analysis of originality and Balganesh and Menell’s analysis of the 
public distribution right highlight the degree of granularity implicated by a Restatement of Copyright.  
Contrast this analysis with broad common law areas, which often operate at a higher level of doctrinal 
generality. 
 32. Fromer & Silbey, supra note 3, at 361–64. 
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interpretations of it.  Far from being radical or ill-advised, the Restatement of Copyright 
Law is a reasonable and welcome addition to the work of the ALI.33 
Fromer and Silbey thus justify the Restatement by arguing that it is no more than the 
ordinary practice of helping to clarify open areas of law.  They place the process of 
restating the law within a long tradition that includes treatises and other explanatory 
materials.34  Fromer and Silbey then proceed to show how the specific provisions of 
the current draft of the Restatement follow this framework. 
Balganesh and Menell adopt a different approach to bolstering the legitimacy of 
the Restatement.  They respond to concerns about displacing the statute by 
essentially abandoning or greatly constraining the task of re-codification.  Instead of 
creating a new code to compete with the original, the Restatement should simply 
repeat the actual text of the statute itself.  This should then be followed by a new 
section describing the legislative history behind the statutory provision, along with 
relevant judicial opinions and commentary.  This could then be followed by the usual 
Comments and Reporter’s’ Notes.35  Moreover, Balganesh and Menell suggest that 
the Restatement should be cautious in advocating a particular position on an issue 
when different courts might apply different interpretive methods to the question, 
since interpretive methodology is itself a highly contested issue.  Balganesh and 
Menell thus avoid the arguments about supplanting the text by keeping the text front 
and center, making it the focus of the commentary, and modifying the Restatement’s 
methodology to make clear that courts are fundamentally engaged in a process of 
statutory interpretation.36  
Although both Articles find ways to support the legitimacy of the Restatement 
project, in so doing, they reveal another problem, namely a mismatch between what 
the Restatement of Copyright is and what it is perceived to be.  Both articles deal 
with the challenge of restating an authoritative federal statute by, in effect, cabining 
the role of the Restatement.  This is necessary to avoid the argument that the 
Restatement is usurping the authority of the statute.  But the resulting Restatement 
resembles less a Restatement than a particularly good treatise or a sophisticated 
annotated code.  Fromer and Silbey are largely correct in that some sections of the 
current draft are “routine and straightforward.  They will surprise no one and are 
almost boring in their adherence to and synthesis of the copyright statute.”37  Yet if 
 
 33. Id. at 344 (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. at 358–59 (“Like legal treatises enthusiastically embraced by lawyers and judges and cited 
with frequency, the Restatement is one view on the state of the law.  It is a collective view—not a singular 
one—and for that reason, maybe it is an improvement on solo-authored treatises.  But the Restatement 
remains persuasive authority, at best, whose authority is grounded in respect for the ALI.  The ALI 
Restatements are perhaps more persuasive than amicus briefs and experts at trial, which are nevertheless 
encouraged and considered seriously by courts.”). 
 35. Balganesh & Menell, supra note 6, at 322–23.  See also Jon O. Newman, The Myths of 
Textualism and Their Relevance To the ALI’s Restatement of the Law, Copyright, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
411, 423 (2021) (proposing that each Restatement section include both the relevant statutory text and the 
Restatement text). 
 36. Balganesh & Menell, supra note 6, at 323. 
 37. Fromer & Silbey, supra note 3, at 344.  This is not to understate areas of disagreement about 
the content of the “black letter law.”  Indeed, several provisions of the proposed Restatement have 
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this is the case, then what does a Restatement add beyond what one could find in a 
good treatise or set of treatises?38  Similarly, Balganesh and Menell’s proposed 
approach, by effectively abandoning the task of re-codification, creates a work that 
resembles less a Restatement and more a sophisticated and comprehensive annotated 
code.  
This is not to understate the value of such an undertaking.  Indeed, a Restatement 
thus conceived can still play a valuable role in helping judges and practitioners make 
sense of the extensive body of copyright case law that has arisen since 1976.39  
Copyright law does, in fact, contain areas that would benefit from rationalization and 
clarification.  And although several copyright treatises already exist, a Restatement 
does add something insofar as it is the result of the considered judgments of, not one 
or a few authors, but a larger and somewhat more diverse set of authors who may 
have in-depth knowledge across a wide range of different areas of copyright law.  
Relatedly, a Restatement benefits from the imprimatur of the ALI, which enhances 
its authoritative nature (and which also explains why a Restatement is often more 
controversial than a treatise.).  This in turn may bolster its ability to play a useful role 
in rationalizing the case law and suggesting avenues for reform.  
The problem is that, even with all of these potential benefits, this falls short of 
what many expect a Restatement to be.  This is because a common law area of the 
law differs not only in the absence of a governing statute, but in the basic institutional 
structure that gives rise to the law.  The critical difference is that for a common law 
subject, there is no central institution that has the ability or authority to resolve the 
disagreements and inconsistencies that arise from the law as developed in fifty-plus 
different jurisdictions.  In each jurisdiction, the state supreme court has the final word 
on the state’s common law, but no institution can resolve the differences that arise 
between jurisdictions.  A Restatement can thus serve the vital function of codifying 
the black letter law across all of these jurisdictions, noting conflicts between 
jurisdictions, and suggesting ways to resolve them.  In so doing, the Restatement is 
free to create its own organizing structure and clarifying terminology.  And it can do 
all of this without having to compete with an authoritative code.  There is no higher 
authority, so the Restatement stands alone.  At the same time, the Restatement differs 
from a treatise, even an influential treatise, in its attempt to not only describe the law, 
but to codify it, to set it down in authoritative terms, thereby creating a centralized 
generative text that can be used by courts to develop the law further. 
 
generated a good deal of disagreement, as some critics have argued that these provisions do not accurately 
reflect the state of the law.  It is simply to note that such disagreements are similar to disagreements about 
statements of law found in many treatises. 
 38. But see Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable 
Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 498 (2014) (arguing that a Restatement as treatise can play an important 
role by minimizing potential biases found in existing treatises authored by one or a few individuals).  Note 
of course that the Restatement project itself has not been immune to allegations of bias. 
 39. Note that in practice, the degree of disagreement among the lower courts may be overstated.  
Many of the provisions of the current draft Restatement do not identify or settle specific disagreements 
among the lower courts about the meaning of a statutory provision.  Instead, many, if not most, of the 
provisions simply summarize the existing case law’s interpretation of a term. 
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The Restatement of Copyright, as noted above, enjoys no such freedom.  It is 
hampered by the existence of an authoritative code, and thus, as developed above, is 
not completely free to state the black letter law in the first instance.  It must thus 
either limit itself to the areas of law that are left open by the statute or, alternatively, 
abandon the task of restatement and start with the text of the statute itself.  It is thus 
not completely free to introduce its own terminology or to restructure the law in a 
more logical fashion.  Nor is it completely free to derive underlying principles from 
the case law, since in many cases, as Balganesh and Menell point out, the principles 
and policies may be dictated or shaped by the specific legislative history of a 
particular provision.  Balganesh and Menell’s use of the public distribution right is a 
nice example of the challenges, in that the proper interpretation of an ambiguous term 
in the statute may be shaped, not by an appeal to broad principles, but by the specific 
historical context behind the enactment.  The Restatement of Copyright is thus 
heavily constrained by the need to be faithful to an authoritative statute, its structure, 
and its history. 
Even worse, the Restatement must also compete, not just with the statute, but with 
an institution already charged with the task of resolving inconsistencies in the 
doctrine and articulating the principles behind open areas of copyright law:  the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Unlike a common law subject, copyright law does have an 
authoritative centralizing institution.  The Restatement, in stating the black letter law, 
is not free to reject the opinions of the Court, but instead must do its best to faithfully 
articulate and apply the decisions of the Court.  It must thus limit itself to bringing 
order, not to the case law of fifty-plus independent jurisdictions, but to the smaller 
set of lower federal court opinions, subject to consistency with both the statutory text 
and existing Supreme Court precedents.40  It is true, as Fromer and Silbey argue, that 
the Supreme Court’s limited docket means that it will be unable to adequately resolve 
or clarify all the doctrinal areas left open by the statute.  Thus, a Restatement can still 
serve a useful purpose in clarifying many open areas of law.  Yet the authoritative 
nature of Supreme Court opinions limits the ability of the Restatement to serve as a 
source of lasting guidance. 
A good example of this issue can be found in the draft’s treatment of the useful 
article doctrine.  A number of years ago, this would have been a classic example, 
indeed perhaps the ideal example, of an area perfectly suited to the Restatement 
approach.  The statutory text uses a broad term, “separately,” not defined by the 
statute.41  The legislative history sheds little additional light on the precise meaning 
of the term.  And case law developed by the federal courts had created, by some 
accounts, up to nine different conflicting doctrinal tests for when the aesthetic 
features of a useful article could be “separated” from its utilitarian aspects.42  The 
Restatement could have noted the conflicting tests, identified an underlying set of 
 
 40.   See e.g., Hughes, supra note 8, at 389–90 (describing how the Restatement’s treatment of 
“originality” is necessarily and unfortunately constrained by the need to abide by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Feist). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 42.  See Barton Beebe, Star Athletica and the Problem of Panaestheticism, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
275, 281 (2019). 
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principles, provided a new clarifying framework, and suggested, via codification, the 
“better” approach consistent with those principles. 
Yet the Supreme Court’s intervention in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands would 
have severely undercut the value of that work.43  In Star Athletica, the Supreme Court 
wiped away the rich body of conflicting lower court doctrine and replaced it with its 
own test for separability.  In so doing, the Court largely ignored the pre-existing case 
law and derived a test from the plain text of the statute.  As many commentators have 
observed, the Court’s test suffers from a number of important flaws and will no doubt 
generate additional conflicting case law in the lower federal courts as they attempt to 
implement the new test.44  
For present purposes, though, this example highlights the difficulty of restating 
the law, even in these open areas, when there exists an authoritative institution that 
has the power to definitively state the “black-letter law.”  With a common law 
subject, there exists no similar centralizing institution.  If a state supreme court issues 
an opinion on a particular issue, it need not diminish the value of the Restatement, as 
the opinion represents the law in only one jurisdiction and can comfortably be folded 
into the broader framework established by the Restatement.  With copyright law, 
however, the Restatement enjoys no such flexibility.  This is because the Restatement 
of Copyright is constrained by the need to state the black letter law, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court is the final and authoritative arbiter of how to interpret the Copyright 
Act.45  And unlike a treatise, which can easily be updated to accommodate the new 
precedent, a Restatement’s codification is meant to endure or at least hold relevance 
for a longer period of time.46   
The same exact phenomenon described above could occur in any open area of 
copyright law.  For example, the Restatement could usefully address the many 
different and potentially inconsistent tests that various circuits have developed for 
determining “improper appropriation,” a critically important element of the basic 
copyright infringement claim.  This is very much a common law area of copyright, 
largely free from statutory interpretation, subject to inconsistent and often confusing 
terminology in the lower federal courts.  The Restatement could play a tremendously 
valuable role, clarifying the terminology, resolving inconsistencies between circuits, 
 
 43. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002 (2017). 
 44.   See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Shoveling a Path After Star Athletica, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1216 
(2019); Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 
75 (2018); Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual Property Law, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2017); Mark P. McKenna, Essay, Knowing Separability When We See It, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 127 (2017); Peter S. Menell & Daniel Yablon, Essay, Star Athletica’s Fissure 
in the Intellectual Property Functionality Landscape, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137 (2017); Christopher 
Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Essay, Forgetting Functionality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 121 
(2017). 
 45. Note however that it is also possible that the Supreme Court might have listened to the 
Restatement and adopted its framework.  See discussion of the problem of audience, infra Part III. 
 46. Note also that the Supreme Court is not the only institution that can play a centralizing role in 
copyright.  The Copyright Office is also a source of interpretive guidance about open areas of copyright 
law, particularly ones involving copyrightability.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (3d ed., 2021).  Thus, unlike common law Restatements, the Restatement 
of Copyright must compete with several institutions that play a centralizing role. 
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providing a clear analytical framework, and proposing a particular approach.  Yet all 
of this useful work could be rendered moot with a Supreme Court opinion.  Under a 
best-case scenario, the Court could adopt the Restatement’s recommended approach.  
Yet it is just as likely that the Court could adopt an approach at odds with the 
Restatement’s, thus making the Restatement’s description of the black letter law not 
only moot but substantively erroneous.  The existence of an authoritative institution 
thus casts a shadow over the Restatement’s efforts. 
Another way of highlighting the problem is by returning to this passage at the very 
beginning of the Restatement’s style guide: 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the verb “restate” as “to state 
again or in a new form” [emphasis added].  This definition neatly captures the central 
tension between the two impulses at the heart of the Restatement process from the 
beginning, the impulse to recapitulate the law as it presently exists and the impulse to 
reformulate it, thereby rendering it clearer and more coherent while subtly transforming 
it in the process.47 
The “central tension” identified here plays a productive role in a Restatement of a 
common law subject.  This is because the act of common law judging merges “is” 
and “ought,” allowing development of the law in accordance with broad principles.  
A Restatement can thus bridge the gap between what the law is and what the law 
ought to be by setting out an idealized text that reflects both, and persuading common 
law courts to adopt it.  That same tension is far more difficult to bridge when the 
body of law is governed by an authoritative statute interpreted by an authoritative 
body.  If the Restatement focuses on what the law is, then it is limited to discerning 
congressional intent or predicting what the Supreme Court might do.  If the 
Restatement focuses on what the law ought to be, then it raises concerns about 
legitimacy, since the statute and the Court are the final arbiters. 
The end result is that the Reporters of the Restatement of Copyright face an 
unenviable task.  On the one hand, the Restatement is hemmed in by the existence 
of, and need to defer to, an authoritative and comprehensive federal statute, 
authoritatively interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.  On the other hand, a more 
modest Restatement adds only marginal value to a copyright treatise or annotated 
code, and thus falls short of the lofty goals generally expected of a Restatement.  
There is thus a gap between what the Restatement is and needs to be, in order to 
preserve its legitimacy, and what Restatements are commonly understood to be, 
namely broad restatements and codifications of areas of law.  
This gap may explain why there has been so much controversy over the 
Restatement of Copyright.  As Fromer and Silbey note, Restatements of common 
law subjects are not immune from controversy.48  Yet the existence of an 
authoritative statute limits the obvious value of a Restatement in the context of 
copyright law, thus placing pressure on the question:  Why a Restatement?  If the 
Restatement does not add value in the traditional ways noted above, what is it trying 
 
 47. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020), at xi (quoting ALI, CAPTURING THE VOICE, supra 
note 1, at 4) (alteration in original). 
 48. Fromer & Silbey, supra note 3, at 349. 
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to accomplish?  This creates room for suspicions about ulterior motives, even when 
such motives may not exist.  It is this disjuncture between what the Restatement 
purports to be and how it is regarded that contributes to this problem.  If the same 
exact text had been styled a treatise, or even an annotated code, by a private group 
of academics, then there would be far less controversy. 
III. 
In the end, there are several potential ways out of this conundrum, to eliminate or 
reduce the gap between what the Restatement is and what it is expected to be.  The 
two Articles discussed above suggest two different possibilities.  The Restatement 
could follow Balganesh and Menell’s suggestion and, instead of making any attempt 
to restate the law, simply reproduce the statutory language, along with the relevant 
interpretive materials, and then comment upon the case law relevant to the statutory 
provision.49  Although this would no doubt result in a very useful work, it would 
perhaps be better not to call this a Restatement, since it is missing an essential feature 
of common law Restatements.  Calling it something else would have the advantage 
of clarifying precisely what the work is doing and avoiding the gap between the work 
as it exists and the work as it is perceived.  
Alternatively, per Fromer and Silbey, the Restatement could hold onto its central 
task of codifying the law, but confine itself to only those areas of copyright law where 
the Copyright Act has expressly delegated the authority to the federal courts to make 
federal common law, i.e., where there is no competing codification.50  Indeed, we 
could have separate Restatements:  a Restatement of Fair Use perhaps, along with a 
Restatement of Infringement.51  I would find such Restatements useful, as there exist 
in each of these areas a large body of federal case law, often pointing in different 
directions or articulating different standards or tests.  Such an approach would 
abandon the task of trying to restate or clarify areas of copyright law that are more 
narrowly codified, even if there is ambiguity in the terms.  Thus, the scope of such 
Restatements would be far more constrained.  These Restatements would still be 
subject to the potential disruption of a conflicting Supreme Court precedent or, less 
likely, a change in the statute.  But the benefit would be clarity and transparency, and 
a better fit with common law Restatements.52 
More broadly, it may also be useful, in adapting the Restatement along either of 
the lines noted above, to revisit the question of the proper audience for the 
Restatement of Copyright, in light of the different institutional structure supporting 
copyright law.  Common law Restatements are supposed to be directed to common 
law courts.  As the ALI’s Revised Style Manual of Restatements notes at the outset:  
 
 49. Balganesh & Menell, supra note 6, at 323. 
 50. Fromer & Silbey, supra note 3, at 362–64. 
 51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) PROPERTY:  SERVITUDES (AM. L. INST. 2000). 
 52. Note that there are other alternatives to a Restatement project:  model codes, principles projects, 
etc.  Indeed, there were initial proposals to undertake a principles project for copyright law, but these 
proposals were ultimately rejected in favor of a Restatement.  See Balganesh & Menell, supra note 6, at 
313–16. 
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“Restatements are primarily addressed to courts.  They aim at clear formulations of 
common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently 
stands or might appropriately be stated by a court.”53  Balganesh and Menell, in their 
Article, take this as the proper audience and structure their proposal in accordance 
with it, trying to make the Restatement more useful to the lower federal courts. 
Although the focus on the courts as the audience makes sense for a common law 
Restatement, it may be worth considering whether it makes equal sense in the context 
of a federal statutory Restatement.  In a common law field, any change in the law 
must come, in the first instance, from the courts themselves.  A Restatement, by 
providing a centralized and rationalized codification of the black letter law, with a 
clear structure and consistent terminology, can help persuade individual jurisdictions 
(ultimately the state supreme courts) to adopt these rules.  For a Restatement of 
Copyright, it may be that the lower federal courts play the same role.  The 
Restatement can thus help the lower courts understand and make sense of 
inconsistencies in the judge-made law and choose the “better” approach.  Such a 
result would be particularly valuable in, for example, the many inconsistent 
treatments of the standard for infringement currently found in the lower federal 
courts.  
At the same time, the more complex institutional structure supporting copyright 
law suggests that this focus on the lower federal courts as the audience may not be 
entirely appropriate.  For example, perhaps the proper audience is not the lower 
courts, but the U.S. Supreme Court?  As mentioned above, copyright law, unlike 
areas of state common law, has an authoritative expositor of the law.  So perhaps the 
proper audience, or at least an audience, whether expressly or implicitly, is the U.S. 
Supreme Court?  Perhaps the goal is not to persuade the lower federal courts to 
coalesce around a particular understanding of copyright law, but to persuade the U.S. 
Supreme Court, as the final authority, to adopt that understanding?  Or, to push this 
further, perhaps the proper audience is the ultimate source of authority on copyright:  
the U.S. Congress?  Perhaps an additional goal of the Restatement might be to 
convince Congress to amend the statute to reform or bring clarity to existing 
copyright doctrines. 
Of course, depending on the audience, the Restatement might look very different.  
A “restatement” directed at convincing Congress to change the law would look very 
little like a Restatement, and more a pure policy document, or perhaps a principles 
project.  But the point is to ask, are we so certain that the Restatement is directed just 
at the lower federal courts?  In not only summarizing the “black letter law,” but also 
commenting upon it, a Restatement is implicitly asking the Supreme Court to adopt 
a “better” understanding of the law.  It may also be implicitly recommending that 
Congress change a particular portion of the Copyright Act.  This is all just to suggest 
that the project of restating copyright law implicates a number of different 
institutional actors, and thus is even more complicated than one might expect.  I do 
not envy the Reporters of the Restatement of Copyright. 
 
 53. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020), at xi (quoting ALI, CAPTURING THE VOICE, supra 
note 1, at 4). 
